### 2ac transition wars

#### Social science proves—multipolarity supports the natural incentive to seek status by fighting

**Wohlforth, 09** – professor of government at Dartmouth (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Affairs, January, project muse)

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29]

Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.

Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

### 2ac unilat good

#### Unilateralism is unsustainable–

#### Power dilution- transition in combat from conventional war to non-state and small state actors make conventional hard power useless

#### Multiple conflicts mean US overstretch- that’s 1ac mazaar- and debt and dollar currency are more warrants

**Layne, 12** - Professor and Robert M Gates Chair in National Security in the George HW Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A & M University (Christopher, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana” Quarterly (2012) 56, 203–213, Wiley online)

China’s rise is one powerful indicator of America’s relative decline. The United States’ mounting economic and ﬁscal problems—evidenced in summer 2011 by the debt ceiling debacle and Standard & Poors’ downgrading of US Treasury bonds—are another. There are two closely interconnected aspects of the United States’ domestic difﬁculties that merit special attention: the spiraling US national debt and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Between now and 2025, the looming debt and dollar crises almost certainly will compel the United States to retrench strategically, and to begin scaling back its overseas military commitments.

The causes of the looming US ﬁscal crisis are complex. For understanding, a good starting point is the late political scientist Arnold Wolfers’ observation that modern great powers must be both national security states and welfare states (Wolfers 1952). States must provide both guns—the military capabilities needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and supplying needed public goods (education, health care, pensions). Since World War II, the United States has pretty much been able to avoid making difﬁcult ‘‘guns or butter’’ decisions precisely because of its hegemonic role in the international economy. The dollar’s role as the international system’s reserve currency allows the United States to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot. As long as others believe that the United States will repay its debts, and that uncontrollable inﬂation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the United States can ﬁnance its external ambitions (‘‘guns’’) and domestic social and economic programs (‘‘butter’’) by borrowing money from foreigners. As Figure 4 shows, this is what the United States has had to do since the early 1980s when it started running a chronic current account deﬁcit. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority of US government debt is owed to foreign, not domestic, investors, and China is the United States government’s largest creditor.

Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious questions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inﬂation.8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Recession, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitlement programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been ﬁnanced by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to ﬁght there, and ﬁscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011).

Because of the combined costs of federal government expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deﬁcits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt⁄GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable ﬁscal problem’’ (CBO 2009:13). In a subsequent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current ﬁscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its ﬁnancial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the growing US national debt—and the budget deﬁcits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining foreign investors’ conﬁdence in the United States’ ability to repay its debts and keep inﬂation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inﬂows from abroad both to ﬁnance its deﬁcit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency.

America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’sx reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’ It is special because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and⁄or prints money to pay them. The United States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the ‘‘credit card’’ provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, the United States would have to pay for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reducing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States would have to learn to live within its means.9 As a leading expert on international economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in, the dollar’s vulnerability ‘‘presents potentially signiﬁcant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance’’ (Kirshner 2008).

#### China rise­– other countries like India and China are balancing against the US, ensuring collapse

#### Domestic problems, isolationism, and lack of public support

**Cohen, 2-21**-12 – [Michael A., fellow at the Century Foundation, “Rotting from the Inside Out,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/rotting_from_the_inside_out>]

The debate over American decline is missing the point. **All this talk about projecting U.S. power abroad means nothing if we can't fix our severe problems at home.** Barack Obama and Mitt Romney don't generally agree on much. But these days they appear to have one area of surprising consensus -- they both believe that stories of American decline are greatly exaggerated. According to Foreign Policy's own Josh Rogin, Obama has been praising Robert Kagan's recent article in the New Republic on the myth of American decline -- a perhaps not unsurprising position to take for a candidate regularly accused of being insufficiently exceptionalist. Romney -- author of No Apology: The Case for American Greatness -- also counts Kagan among his top foreign-policy advisors. Kagan's article, as well as his new book, The World America Made , is the most obvious recent example of pushback against the declinist meme, but others have also taken up the mantle. In the recent issue of International Security, Michael Beckley wrote a widely cited piece that argues "America's Edge Will Endure" against potential rivals like China. FP's Daniel Drezner has adopted a similar view. These anti-declinists largely base their arguments around the notion that U.S. economic and military power, compared to other countries, is unsurpassed -- and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Kagan frames a good part of his argument around America's "relative power" -- factors such as "the size and the influence of its economy relative to that of other powers; the magnitude of military power compared with that of potential adversaries; the degree of political influence it wields in the international system." By this notion, U.S. global power remains unparalleled and its hegemony is uncontested. There is much to sustain this argument. America today faces no great power rival, no existential threat, and an economy that -- while currently in the doldrums -- remains vibrant and adaptive. Compared to other nations, the United States is not simply a great power, it is the greatest power. Even if its influence declines, it is likely to continue to enjoy an outsized role on the international stage, in part because there is a consensus among foreign-policy elites -- like Romney and Obama, for instance -- that the U.S. must do whatever it takes to remain, as Madeline Albright once put it, "the world's 'indispensable nation.'" There is, however, one serious problem with this analysis. Any discussion of American national security that focuses solely on the issue of U.S. power vis-à-vis other countries -- and ignores domestic inputs -- is decidedly incomplete. In Kagan's New Republic article, for example, he has little to say about the country's domestic challenges except to obliquely argue that to focus on "nation-building" at home while ignoring the importance of maintaining U.S. power abroad would be a mistake. In fact, in a recent FP debate with the Financial Times' Gideon Rachman on the issue of American decline, Kagan diagnoses what he, and many other political analysts, appear to believe is the country's most serious problem: "enormous fiscal deficits driven by entitlements." Why is this bad? It makes it harder, says Kagan, for the United States to "continue playing its vital role in the world" and will lead to significant cutbacks in defense spending. However, a focus on U.S. global dominance or suasion that doesn't factor in those elements that constitute American power at home ignores substantial and worsening signs of decline. Indeed, by virtually any measure, a closer look at the state of the United States today **tells a sobering tale of rapid and unchecked decay and deterioration in a host of areas**. While not all of them are generally considered elements of national security, perhaps they should be. Let's start with education, which almost any observer would agree is a key factor in national competitiveness. The data is not good. According to the most recent OECD report on global education standards , the United States is an average country in how it educates its children -- 12th in reading skills, 17th in science, and 26th in math. The World Economic Forum ranks the United States 48th in the quality of its mathematics and science education, even though we spend more money per student than almost any country in the world. America's high school graduation rate is lower today that it was in the late 1960s and "kids are now less likely to graduate from high school than their parents," according to an analysis released last year by the Editorial Projects in Education Research Center . In fact, not only is the graduation rate worse than many Western countries, the United States is now the only developed country where a higher percentage of 55 to 64-year-olds have a high school diploma than 25 to 34-year-olds. page 2 While the United States still maintains the world's finest university system, college graduation rates are slipping. Among 25 to 34-year-olds , America trailsAustralia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in its percentage of college graduates. This speaks, in some measure, to the disparities that are endemic in the U.S. education system. If you are poor in America, chances are you attend a school that underperforms, are taught by teachers that are not as effective, and have test scores that lag far behind your more affluent counterparts (the same is true if you are black or Hispanic -- you lag behind your white counterparts).Can a country be a great global power if its education system is fundamentally unequal and is getting steadily worse? What about national infrastructure -- another key element of national economic power and global competitiveness? First, the nation's broadband penetration rates remain in the middle of the global pack and there is growing divide in the United States between digital haves and have nots. Overall, its transportation networks are mediocre compared to similarly wealthy countries and according to the World Economic Forum, the United States ranks 23rd in the OECD for infrastructure quality -- a ranking that has steadily declined over the past decade. American commuters spend more time in traffic than Western Europeans, the country's train system and high-speed rail lines in general pale next to that of other developed nations, and even the number of people killed on American highways is 60 percent higher than the OECD average. Part of the problem is that the amount of money the U.S. government spends on infrastructure has steadily declined for decades and now trails far behind other Western nations. In time, such infrastructure disadvantages have the potential to undermine the U.S. economy, hamstring productivity and competitiveness, and put the lives of more Americans at risk -- and this appears to be happening already. Finally, a closer look at the U.S. health care system is enough to make one ill. Even after the passage of Obama's 2010 health care reform bill (which every Republican presidential candidate wants to repeal) the United States is far from having a health care system that meets the needs of its citizens. According to a July 2011 report by the Commonwealth Fund, "the U.S. has fewer hospital beds and physicians, and sees fewer hospital and physician visits, than in most other countries" even though it spends far more on health care per capita than any other country in the world. In addition, "prescription drug utilization, prices, and spending all appear to be highest in the U.S., as does the supply, utilization, and price of diagnostic imaging." Long story short, the United States spends more for less on health care than pretty much any other developed nation in the world. That might also explain why life expectancy in America trails far behind most OECD countries. The United States also has the unique distinction of having one of the highest rates of income inequality in the world, on par with such global powerhouses as Cameroon, Madagascar, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ecuador. It has the fourth worst child poverty rate and trails only Mexico and Turkey in overall poverty rate among OECD countries. And when it comes to infant mortality , the U.S. rate is one of the worst in the developing world. But not to fear, the United States still maintains some advantages. For example, it is one of the fattest countries in the world , with approximately one-third of the country considered obese (including one out of every six children). In addition, the United States has, by far, the largest prison population -- more than China, Iran, and Cuba -- one of the highest homicide rates in the world, and one of the highest rates of death from child abuse and neglect. This steady stream of woe is certainly dispiriting, but the more optimistic might be inclined to respond that America had has problems before and has always found a way to right the ship. Certainly, this is a legitimate counter-point. The problem is that anyone looking to Washington today would have a hard time imagining that Congress and the White House will lock arms anytime soon and fix these various national crises. And **this political gridlock is the biggest reason to be concerned about decline**. Perhaps **at no point in recent American history has the country's politics been less capable of dealing with serious challenges**. Certainly, when one party basically rejects any role for the federal government in providing health care, improving educational opportunity, or strengthening the social safety net, the chances for compromise appear even slimmer. As Harold Pollack, a professor at the University of Chicago, said to me, "What future president, witnessing Barack Obama's difficulties over health reform, will make an equivalent political investment regarding climate change or another great national concern? I fear that we are headed for a kind of legislative Vietnam syndrome in which our leaders will shy away from the large things that must be done." Obama argued in his recent State of the Union speech that "innovation is what America has always been about."Indeed, the recent report of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation found that the United States is currently sixth in global innovation and competitiveness. Good news, right? Not so fast. The report also found that the country is dead last in "improvement in international competitiveness and innovation capacity over the last decade." Bottom line: dysfunction reaps an ill reward. Kagan's retort to this argument is that "on many big issues throughout their history, Americans have found a way of achieving and implementing a national consensus." True, but **the philosophical divide between the two parties over the role of government offers little reason for optimism that such a new national consensus is in the offing**. The fact is, discussions of U.S. power that only take into account America's global standing in relation to other countries are not only misleading -- they're largely irrelevant. Sure, America has a bigger and better military than practically every other nation combined. Sure, it has a better global image than Russia or China or any other potential global rival. Sure, America's economy is bigger than any other nation's (though this is a debatable point ). But if its students aren't being well educated, if huge disparities exist in technological adoption,if social mobility remains stagnant if the country's health care system is poorly functioning, and if its government is hopelessly gridlocked, what good is all the global power that transfixes Kagan and others? The even more urgent question is how the United States can hope to maintain that power if it's built on a shaky foundation at home. Rather than talking about how great America is on the campaign trail -- which surely both candidates will do throughout the 2012 election -- the country would likely be better off having an honest discussion on the immense challenges that it faces at home. Even more helpful would be a recognition that education, health care, infrastructure, and overall national economic competitiveness is as essential to U.S. national security as, for example, the number of ships in the U.S. Navy. All this talk about the myth of American decline might make Americans feel better about themselves for a while, but it is a distraction from the real and declining elements of U.S. power.

#### Obama’s multilateral policies non-unique the link- only multilat solves multiple extinction scenarios

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Captain of a shrinking ship

As noted in the opening passages of this article, the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. Facing this incipient period of decline, America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. Or it can ‘**rage against the dying of the light’**, refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. President Obama’s approach, defined by restraint and awareness of limits, makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that, to cite one example, his predecessor was not. He is, in short, a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him; in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed, they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. 97

If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline, then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment, trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. As part of such a project, it can, as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested, use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power, preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran; deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia; commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade; a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism, regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa.

President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear, not for the first time, that he is no pacifist, spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’, and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year, even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’, he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things,’ he declared. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream, either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions, as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. 100 No doubt sensibly, given the likely political reaction at home, it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. Nevertheless, this is a president who, within the confines of the mainstream, embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policy-making. 101

In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of global power, it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. It may well be, as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe, that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not, on reflection, fill any westerner with glee, whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully, resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. Alternatively, it may result in conflict, if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon, or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short, leaders who can master the art of declining politely. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill.

### T-Conditional – 2AC

#### 1. Counterinterpretation—engagement must be unconditional

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19 ‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

#### we meet- the plan integrates cuba into the world trade system- that’s cross-ex

**3. Prefer our interpretation –**

**a. Turns ground- means we can’t spike out of disad links and counterplans**

**b. Intent to define- Smith is a professor who explicitly defines economic engagement**

**c. Education- the debate over whether QPQ or unconditional engagement is a hughe part of the literature**

**4. Reasonability – competing interpretations create a race to the bottom which arbitrarily excludes our aff**

### 2ac condo (s)

#### Condo is a voting issue –

#### a) Skew – condo allows them to arbitrarily kick arguments destroying effective 2ac strategy

#### b) Decision-making – the need to concede is an important skill to understand arg interaction – allowing them to arbitrarily kick positions prevents this skill

#### c) C/I – One condo allows them to pick their best offense before the round and is reciprocal

#### d) Reject the team to deter abuse and rejecting the arg links to all our offense

### 2ac – Intermediary

#### CP fails –

#### Only US direct engagement will normalize US-Cuba relations—sends signal to other Latin American countries

Zimmerman 2010 – Political Activist at Barnard College

(Chelsea A., “Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy”, 2010, <http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf>, google scholar)//KW

VI. Conclusion Relaxing U.S. trade restrictions will not result in an immediate thaw in relations with Cuba. The Cuban government’s response may be slow, as Raul Castro will need to factor in the changes in U.S. policy into the larger equation of Cuban recovery and economic reform. Moving from a policy of isolation to one of investment and engagement will send a different message to Cuba and sets the stage for fruitful trade possibilities and for normalizing relations between the two countries. In addition, the United States will be sending a signal to other Latin America about its willingness to view the world in cooperative terms. The current U.S. policy toward Cuba has been driven by history, without taking into account political and economic interests of both countries. A policy based on sanctions and regime change is out of touch with the times, and is inconsistent and flawed in its intent and application. The trade embargo imposed on Cuba reflects bad economics, bad business, bad national security strategy, and bad global politics, and warrants a gradual revamping through revised regulations and, ultimately, Congressional action.

#### The CP creates policy incoherence and Cuba won’t respond

**Huddleston and Pascual, 10 –** Brookings Institution (Vicki and Carlos, Learning to Salsa : New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations, p. 158)

Participants also debated whom the United States should work with in the region. Some in the roles of foreign ministers from countries friendly to the United States argued that selective multilateralism, such as seen in the current simulation, would not be a solution. Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, China, and Russia are the countries that must be brought on board with the new synthesis. Still, even if that effort succeeded, the United States was unlikely to work closely with governments that it did not consider committed to a democratic Cuba. Coordinating with those with fundamentally different perspectives would also carry the risk of undermining policy coherence. Even among countries that consider themselves friends of the United States, differing historical perspectives led to tensions in suggested policies and tactics. This raised questions concerning U.S. options if coordinated engagement does not lead to the intended effects, and the Cuban government is unwilling to respond to good-faith negotiations. Should the United States continue to align its policies with a common multilateral policy? Fifty years of acting alone provides empirical evidence that reverting to a unilateral policy of isolating Cuba will not achieve U.S. objectives. For the United States, the dialogue underscored the need to moderate its policies, even if this process proves difficult and is accompanied by new tensions. But the international community should also accept that unleveraged engagement is a weak strategy. To this end, U.S. partners should grant the United States some leeway to manage the sensitive politics of shifting strategies after fifty years, while at the same time reinforcing the importance of pressing Cuba to improve its human rights and rule-of-law profile.

#### The CP doesn't solve any advantage –

1. **Multilat –** Grandin indicates the embargo is a unique symbol of US unilateralism and only by lifting it can we normalize relations and international standing
2. **All our French evidence is a reason why complete lifting and normalization of trade is vital to durable solvency**
3. **Doesn't solve transition** – Only free unfettered access to the US market allows for a stable transition

#### Cuba responds to half-measures like the CP by with confrontational tactics – it means the CP will never spill up to larger engagement

Cuba Study Group 13 – non partisan non for profit made up of business and professional individuals with experience in Cuban US affairs (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, Cuba Study Group, February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File\_id=7f2193cf-d2ef-45c8-91de-0b1f88d30059)//BDS

The Cuban government has become increasingly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices. This is why any sign of a thaw from the United States has repeatedly been followed by confrontation or repression, which in turn has been followed by U.S. domestic pressure to tighten economic sanctions. This pattern has become somewhat predictable, as recently exemplified by Cuba’s imprisonment of U.S. contractor Alan Gross after President Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009 and U.S. policymakers’ refusal to pursue improved bilateral relations in response.xvi It can be reasonably concluded that elements of the Cuban government do not, in fact, seek any substantial liberalization from U.S. sanctions. Indeed, Helms-Burton provides them with an alibi for their own failures and may well be essential to their political survival. Senator Jesse Helms famously said that Helms-Burton “tightened the noose around the neck of the last dictator in the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro.”xvii In practice, however, Helms-Burton may have served as an incredibly convenient life raft, giving a struggling and failing system the legitimacy that comes from the appearance of being a “state under siege.”

#### Permutation: do both

#### CP links to politics- triggers the same perception

#### Binding consultation crushes heg

Carroll ‘9(James FF, Notes & Comments Editor – Emory International Law Review, J.D. with Honors – Emory University School of Law, “Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act's Conception of National Security”, Emory International Law Review, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, Lexis, NG)

n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 12. This does not mean, however, that foreign countries should hold a veto over U.S. foreign or domestic policies, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. Allowing foreign countries or international institutions to veto or modify unrelated U.S. policies would make a mockery of our foreign policy and destroy the credibility of American leadership. International cooperation does not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations. See generally The Allies and Arms Control (F.O. Hampson et al. eds., 1992). See also Khalilzad, supra note 177.

### at: cyberterror

#### Immigrants don’t solve

by Lindsey Robbins 11 "Government clearance a roadblock for tech graduates" Feb 11 www.gazette.net/stories/02112011/businew194439\_32536.php

As more cybersecurity companies seek to partner with colleges and universities to tap their graduates for their work forces, some officials worry the graduates may be unable to obtain the federal security clearance they need to be hired.¶ Although most students graduating with bachelor's degrees in the science, technology, engineering and math fields involved in cybersecurity are U.S. citizens who are easily eligible for clearance, the percentage of foreign students increases with each degree level, said Patrick O'Shea, co-director of the University of Maryland's cybersecurity center in College Park. Foreign students here on visas make up one-third of master's graduates in these fields and more than half of the Ph.D. graduates, he said.¶ It's a nationwide phenomenon, O'Shea said.¶ "It's very expensive to get them through the immigration process," said Linda Hartwig, a spokeswoman for Arinc in Annapolis. "Most of them are not candidates we would even consider."

#### Newest, most-qualified report says no shortage

Hickey 13 [Walter, B.S. Applied Mathematics (William and Mary), Politics and Markets Reporter

Business Insider, “A Brand New Report Shows Just How Wrong Silicon Valley Is About A Tech Worker Shortage,” Business Insider, 5/31, <http://www.businessinsider.com/a-brand-new-report-shows-just-how-wrong-silicon-valleys-claim-of-a-stem-shortage-is-2013-5#ixzz2Wcm0nFLe>]

A new report from the esteemed Georgetown Center on Education and the Workforce presents a pretty significant rebuttal to that claim. ¶ Released on Wednesday, the annual report looks at how new college graduates are faring in the recession-era economy. ¶ That it's titled "Hard Times" should give you a decent idea on how millennials are doing. ¶ Most interesting is the technology sector numbers. Were there truly a STEM shortage — were demand for STEM majors to exceed supply — one would expect that unemployment statistics for recent STEM graduates would be outstandingly low. ¶ The reality? Nope. From the report:¶ Unemployment seems mostly concentrated in information systems (14.7 %) compared with computer science (8.7%) and mathematics (5.9%). As noted in an earlier report, hiring tends to be slower for users of information compared to those who write programs and create software applications.¶ Let's get a little perspective here. According to the report, new information science graduates have worse unemployment than sociology (9.9%), archaeology (12.6%) and English (9.8%) majors. ¶ Hard Times¶ What gives?¶ If there's a STEM shortage, why are one in every eleven recent computer science graduates out of a job? Why are one in every seven information science majors out of work if Silicon Valley is so desperate to import talent?¶ The reality is that from an economic perspective we don't have a STEM shortage.¶ What we may have is a "STEM majors who have the skills that Silicon Valley prefers" shortage.¶ But to say we have a STEM shortage is needlessly hyperbolic.

#### No impact—their authors construct and inflate threats

Brito and Watkins 11 – Jerry is a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Tate is a Research Associate at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. (“Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy”, April 26, 2011, <http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/110421-cybersecurity.pdf>)

Over the past two years there has been a steady drumbeat of alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington about potential catastrophic cyber threats. For example, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last year, Chairman Carl Levin said that “cyberweapons and cyberattacks potentially can be devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects.”1 Proposed responses include increased federal spending on cybersecurity and the regulation of private network security practices. The rhetoric of “cyber doom”2 employed by proponents of increased federal intervention, however, lacks clear evidence of a serious threat that can be verified by the public. As a result, the United States may be witnessing a bout of threat inflation similar to that seen in the run-up to the Iraq War. Additionally, a cyber-industrial complex is emerging, much like the military-industrial complex of the Cold War. This complex may serve to not only supply cybersecurity solutions to the federal government, but to drum up demand for them as well. Part I of this article draws a parallel between today’s cybersecurity debate and the run-up to the Iraq War and looks at how an inflated public conception of the threat we face may lead to unnecessary regulation of the Internet. Part II draws a parallel between the emerging cybersecurity establishment and the military-industrial complex of the Cold War and looks at how unwarranted external influence can lead to unnecessary federal spending. Finally, Part III surveys several federal cybersecurity proposals and presents a framework for analyzing the cybersecurity threat. I.THREAT INFLATION, THE IRAQ WAR, AND PARALLELS TO THE CYBER DEBATE Threat inflation is a concept in political science that refers to “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify.”3 Different actors— including members of Congress; defense contractors; journalists; policy experts; academics; and civilian, military, and intelligence officials—will each have their own motives for contributing to threat inflation. When a threat is inflated, the marketplace of ideas on which a democracy relies to make sound judgments—in particular, the media and popular debate—can become overwhelmed by fallacious information.4 The result can be unwarranted public support for misguided policies. A. Run-Up to the Iraq War The run-up to the Iraq War illustrates the dynamic of threat inflation. After 9/11, the Bush Administration decided to invade Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein.5 Lacking any clear casus belli, the administration sought popular and congressional support for war by promoting several rationales that ultimately proved baseless.6 First, the administration implied that the Iraqi regime was connected to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.7 In a major speech outlining the Iraqi threat in October of 2002, President Bush stated that Iraq and al Qaeda had longstanding links, and that Iraq had provided training and medical treatment to members of al Qaeda.8 Vice President Cheney on various occasions made the claim that 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta had met with an Iraqi official in Prague in 2001.9 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called evidence of the link “bulletproof,” and Condoleezza Rice echoed those claims.10 We now know that there was no solid evidence for those statements.11 For one thing, al Qaeda, under the direction of Osama Bin Laden, was a fundamentalist Muslim organization that despised the secular government of Saddam Hussein.12 More specifically, investigations by the FBI, CIA, and the U.N. concluded that these links did not exist.13 Mohamed Atta, for example, was in Florida at the time the alleged Prague meeting took place.14 President Bush ultimately admitted that he “had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 11th,” but he did so only after the war had commenced. 15 As late as 2006, however, over 40 percent of Americans still said they believed Saddam Hussein was “personally” involved in the 9/11 attacks.16 Second, the administration also sought to make the case that Iraq threatened its neighbors and the United States with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). By framing the issue in terms of WMD, the administration was conflating the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.17 While no doubt terrible, the destructive power of biological and chemical weapons is tiny next to that of a nuclear detonation.18 Conflating these threats, however, allowed the administration to link the unlikely but serious threat of nuclear weapons to the more likely but less serious threat posed by biological and chemical weapons.19 The president, vice president, and senior members of the administration made the claim that Iraq was close to acquiring nuclear weapons.20 They made these claims without providing any verifiable evidence. The evidence they did provide—Iraq’s alleged pursuit of uranium “yellowcake” from Niger and its purchase of aluminum tubes allegedly meant for uranium enrichment centrifuges—were ultimately determined to be unfounded.21 The administration was also aware at the time that the evidence it was presenting was problematic. The CIA had investigated the claim that Iraq had attempted to buy yellowcake in Niger and had concluded that it was false.22 Weeks before the invasion, it was revealed that the documents on which the claim had been predicated were forgeries.23 Similarly, technical experts at the Department of Energy had concluded that the aluminum tubes that had been purchased by Iraq were not suitable for uranium enrichment and were likely meant to build artillery rockets.24 Despite the lack of verifiable evidence to support the administration’s claims, the news media tended to report them unquestioned.25 The initial reporting on the aluminum tubes claim, for example, came in the form of a front page New York Times article by Judith Miller and Michael Gordon that relied entirely on anonymous administration sources.26 The article gave the impression that there was consensus that the tubes were meant for uranium enrichment.27 Later reporting by Miller and Gordon noted that, in fact, there were dissenting opinions on the purpose of the tubes among government experts.28 However, they were quick to dismiss those views, citing “other, more senior, officials” who insisted that the skeptics represented a minority view.29 One reason why the New York Times reports have been criticized so strongly is that they were later cited by the administration in making its case for war.30 Appearing on Meet the Press, Vice President Cheney answered a question about evidence of a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear program by stating: There’s a story in The New York Times this morning—this is—I don’t— and I want to attribute The Times. I don’t want to talk about, obviously, specific intelligence sources, but it’s now public that, in fact, [Saddam Hussein] has been seeking to acquire, and we have been able to intercept and prevent him from acquiring through this particular channel, the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge.31 This meant that the administration was able to cite its own leak—with the added imprimatur of the Times—as a rationale for war. Miller, who was criticized after the invasion for her credulous reporting, has defended herself by stating that as a reporter, “my job isn’t to assess the government’s information and be an independent intelligence analyst myself. My job is to tell readers of The New York Times what the government thought about Iraq’s arsenal.”32 This view of reporting as mere conduit for anonymous administration officials is dangerous because it can serve to give the endorsement of an independent media on controlled leaks by government insiders.33 Most members of Congress similarly took the administration at its word and were uncritical of the evidence underpinning the rationales for war. As Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz write, A large and critical group of Democrats, whose national profiles might have bolstered the opposition to war, shied away from criticizing the popular president leading the War on Terror: while a handful jumped enthusiastically on the Iraq bandwagon, many others quietly favored invasion or at most criticized unilateral action.34 While there are competing theories why it may have been the case,35 the fact is that our system of checks and balances failed to test the evidence of a serious threat from Iraq. B. Cyber Threat Inflation Over the past two years, there has been a drive for increased federal involvement in cybersecurity. This drive is evidenced by the introduction of several comprehensive cybersecurity bills in Congress,36 the initiation of several regulatory proceedings related to cybersecurity by the Federal Communications Commission and Commerce Department,37 and increased coverage of the issue in the media.38 The official consensus seems to be that the United States is facing a grave and immediate threat that only quick federal intervention can address.39 This narrative has gone largely unchallenged by members of Congress or the press, and it has inflated the threat. There is very little verifiable evidence to substantiate the threats claimed, and the most vocal proponents of a threat engage in rhetoric that can only be characterized as alarmist. Cyber threat inflation parallels what we saw in the run-up to the Iraq War. 1. The CSIS Commission Report One of the most widely cited arguments for increased federal involvement in cybersecurity can be found in the report of the Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency.40 The Commission was convened by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank focused on foreign policy and defense. It was chaired by two members of Congress and composed of representatives of the IT industry, security consultants, academics, and former government officials.41 Beginning in February 2008, the Commission acted as a self-appointed transition team for whoever the next president would be. It held a series of open and closed-door meetings, received classified briefings from government officials,42 and in December issued its report warning that “cybersecurity is now a major national security problem for the United States,”43 and recommending that the federal government “regulate cyberspace.”44 In its report, the Commission makes assertions about the nature of the threat, such as, “America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the new administration that will take office in January 2009. It is . . . a battle fought mainly in the shadows. It is a battle we are losing.”45 Unfortunately, the report provides little evidence to support such assertions. There is a brief recitation of various instances of cyber-espionage conducted against government computer systems.46 However, it does not put these cases in context, nor does it explain how these particular breaches demonstrate a national security crisis, or that “we are losing.” The report notes that Department of Defense computers are “probed hundreds of thousands of times each day.”47 This is a fact that proponents of increased federal involvement in cybersecurity often cite as evidence for a looming threat.48 However, probing and scanning networks are the digital equivalent of trying doorknobs to see if they are unlocked—a maneuver available to even the most unsophisticated would-be hackers.49 The number of times a computer network is probed is not evidence of an attack or a breach, or a even of a problem.50 More ominously, the report states that Porous information systems have allowed opponents to map our vulnerabilities and plan their attacks. Depriving Americans of electricity, communications, and financial services may not be enough to provide the margin of victory in a conflict, but it could damage our ability to respond and our will to resist. We should expect that exploiting vulnerabilities in cyber infrastructure will be part of any future conflict.”51 An enemy able to take down our electric, communications, and financial networks at will could be a serious national security threat. And it may well be the case that the state of security in government and private networks is deplorable. But the CSIS report advances no reviewable evidence to substantiate this supposed threat. There is no evidence in the report that opponents have “mapped vulnerabilities” and “planned attacks.” The probing of DoD computers and the specific cases of cyber espionage that the report cites do not bear on the probability of a successful attack on the electrical grid. Nevertheless, the Commission report and the cybersecurity bills it inspired prescribe regulation of the Internet. The report asserts plainly: “It is undeniable that an appropriate level of cybersecurity cannot be achieved without regulation, as market forces alone will never provide the level of security necessary to achieve national security objectives.”52 But without any verifiable evidence of a threat, how is one to know what exactly is the “appropriate level of cybersecurity” and whether market forces are providing it? How is one to judge whether the recommendations that make up the bulk of the Commission’s report are necessary or appropriate? Although never clearly stated, the implication seems to be that the report’s authors are working from classified sources, which might explain the dearth of verifiable evidence.53 To its credit, the Commission laments what it considers the “overclassification” of information related to cybersecurity.54 But this should not serve as an excuse. If our past experience with threat inflation teaches us anything, it is that we cannot accept the word of government officials with access to classified information as the sole source of evidence for the existence or scope of a threat. The watchword is “trust but verify.” Until those who seek regulation can produce clear reviewable evidence of a threat, we should discount assertions such as “The evidence is both compelling and overwhelming,”55 and, “This is a strategic issue on par with weapons of mass destruction and global jihad.”56 2. Cyber War While the CSIS Commission report may be one of the most cited documents suggesting that we face a grave cyber threat requiring an immediate federal response, the most popular brief for this view is the 2010 bestselling book Cyber War. 57 In it, former presidential cybersecurity advisor Richard A. Clarke and Council on Foreign Relations fellow Richard K. Knake make the case that the United States and its infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to military cyber attack by enemy states. They offer a set of recommendations that includes increased regulation of Internet service providers (ISPs) and electrical utilities.58 Clarke and Knake are clear about the threat they foresee. “Obviously, we have not had a full-scale cyber war yet,” they write, “but we have a good idea what it would look like if we were on the receiving end.”59 The picture they paint includes the collapse of the government’s classified and unclassified networks, refinery fires and explosions in cities across the country, the release of “lethal clouds of chlorine gas” from chemical plants, the midair collision of 737s, train derailments, the destruction of major financial computer networks, suburban gas pipeline explosions, a nationwide power blackout, and satellites in space spinning out of control.60 They explain somberly about the scene: Several thousand Americans have already died, multiples of that number are injured and trying to get to hospitals. . . . In the days ahead, cities will run out of food because of the train-system failures and the jumbling of data at trucking and distribution centers. Power will not come back up because nuclear plants have gone into secure lockdown and many conventional plants have had their generators permanently damaged. High-tension transmission lines on several key routes have caught fire and melted. Unable to get cash from ATMs or bank branches, some Americans will begin to loot stores. . . . In all the wars America has fought, no nation has ever done this kind of damage to our cities. A sophisticated cyber war attack by one of several nation-states could do that today, in fifteen minutes, without a single terrorist or soldier appearing in this country.61 According to Clarke and Knake, that is the threat we face unless the federal government takes immediate action. Readers of their bestselling book would no doubt be as frightened at the prospect of a cyber attack as they might have been at the prospect of Iraq passing nuclear weapons to al Qaeda. Yet Clarke and Knake assure us, “These are not hypotheticals.”62 Unfortunately, they present little, if any, evidence.63 The only verifiable evidence they present to support the possibility of a cyber doomsday relates to several well-known distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. A DDOS attack works by flooding a server on the Internet with more requests that it can handle, thereby causing it to malfunction. For example, the web server that hosts www.gmu.edu has a certain limited bandwidth and processing capacity with which to serve George Mason University’s home page to visitors.64 If several dozen persons were browsing university web pages and simultaneously requested GMU’s homepage, the server would likely perform perfectly well. However, if the server encountered a hundred thousand requests for the home page every second, it would be overwhelmed and would likely shut down. A person carrying out a DDOS attack will almost certainly employ a botnet to cause the massive flood of requests on the attacked server. A botnet is a network of computers that have been compromised without their users’ knowledge, usually through a computer virus.65 The attacker remotely controls these computers and commands them to carry out the attack.66 Experts have estimated that over 25 percent of personal computers are compromised and form part of a botnet.67 Clarke and Knake point to several well-known DDOS attacks as evidence of a threat. Specifically, they cite attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, both suspected by many to have been coordinated by Russia.68 They also mention an attack on U.S. and NATO websites after the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade,69 and a July 4, 2009 attack on U.S. and South Korean websites widely attributed to North Korea.70 These reputedly state-sponsored attacks, along with the hundreds of thousands of other DDOS attacks by criminals and vandals seen each year,71 are evidence of the sorry state of consumer computer security and of how vulnerable publicly accessible servers can be. They are not, however, evidence of the type of capability necessary to derail trains, release chlorine gas, or bring down the power grid. The authors admit that a DDOS attack is often little more than a nuisance.72 The 1999 attack saw websites temporarily taken down or defaced, but “did little damage to U.S. military or government operations.”73 Similarly, the 2009 attacks against the United States and South Korea caused several government agency websites, as well as the websites of NASDAQ, NYSE, and the Washington Post to be intermittently inaccessible for a few hours, but did not threaten the integrity of those institutions.74 In fact, Clarke points out that the White House’s servers were able to easily deflect the attack thanks to the simple technique of “edge caching,” which he had arranged as cybersecurity coordinator.75 Without any formal regulation mandating that it be done, the affected agencies and businesses worked with Internet service providers to filter out the attacks.76 Once the attackers realized they were no longer having an effect, the attacks stopped.77 Georgia similarly addressed attacks on its websites by moving them to more resilient servers hosted outside of the country.78 Clarke and Knake recognize that DDOS is an unsophisticated and “primitive” form of attack that would not pose a major threat to national security.79 Nevertheless, reference to DDOS attacks make up the bulk of the verifiable evidence they present. They assert, however, that the reason we have no verifiable evidence of a greater threat is that “attackers did not want to reveal their more sophisticated capabilities, yet.”80 Specifically referring to the Georgian and Estonian episodes, they write that “[t]he Russians are probably saving their best cyber weapons for when they really need them, in a conflict in which NATO and the United States are involved.”81 The implication is eerily reminiscent of the suggestion before the invasion of Iraq that although we lacked the type of evidence of WMD that might lead us to action, we would not want “the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”82 Clarke and Knake have no proof to corroborate the type of vulnerabilities that could pose a serious national security risk. For example, one of the threats they identify as most serious is a sustained nationwide power outage.83 The evidence they offer is either not reviewable or easily debunked. To show that the electrical grid is vulnerable, they suggest that the Northeast power blackout of 2003 was caused in part by the “Slammer” worm, which had been spreading across the Internet around that time.84 However, the final report of the joint U.S.–Canadian task force that investigated the blackout explained clearly in 2004 that no virus, worm, or other malicious software contributed to the power failure.85 Clarke and Knake also point to a 2007 blackout in Brazil, which they believe was the result of criminal hacking of the power system.86 However, separate investigations by the utility company involved, Brazil’s independent systems operator, and the energy regulator all concluded that the power failure was the result of soot and dust deposits on high voltage insulators on transmission lines.87 Given the weakness of the public evidence they offer, it is difficult to trust the evidence Clarke and Knake present based on anonymous sources. Specifically, they write that countries such as China have “laced U.S. infrastructure with logic bombs.”88 That is, that hackers have penetrated into the control systems of utilities, including the electrical grid, and left behind computer programs that can later be triggered remotely to cause damage.89 Depending on the scope of the intrusions and which systems are compromised, this could pose a serious threat. However, Clarke and Knake present only suppositions, not evidence. We are told that “America’s national security agencies are now getting worried about logic bombs, since they seem to have found them all over our electric grid,”90 and that “[enemies] have probably done everything short of a few keystrokes of what they would do in real cyber war.”91 This is speculation. The notion that our power grid, air traffic control system, and financial networks are rigged to blow at the press of a button would be terrifying if it were true. But fear should not be a basis for public policy making. We learned after the invasion of Iraq to be wary of conflated threats and flimsy evidence. If we are to pursue the type of regulation of Internet service providers and utilities that Clarke and Knake advocate, we should demand more precise evidence of the threat against which we intend to guard, and of the probability that such a threat can be realized. Clarke and Knake lament their position when they write, “How do you convince someone that they have a problem when there is no evidence you can give them?”92 Like the CSIS Commission, they recognize that there is insufficient public debate because much of the information about the state of cybersecurity is classified.93 Citizens should trust but verify, and that will require declassification and a more candid, on-the-record discussion of the threat by government officials. 3. The Media and Other Experts Much as in the run-up to the Iraq War, some in the media may be contributing to threat inflation by reporting the alarmist view of a possible threat in a generally uncritical fashion. For example, while Clarke and Knake’s Cyber War has been widely criticized in the security trade press,94 the popular media took the book at its word. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Mort Zuckerman warned that enemy hackers could easily “spill oil, vent gas, blow up generators, derail trains, crash airplanes, cause missiles to detonate, and wipe out reams of financial and supply-chain data.”95 The sole source for his column, and for his recommendation that the federal government establish a federal cybersecurity agency to regulate private networks, was Clarke’s “revealing” book.96 The New York Times’s review was also approving, sweeping aside skepticism of the book’s doomsday scenarios by noting that Clarke, who had previously warned the Bush and Clinton administrations about the threat from al Qaeda before 9/11, had been right in the past.97 The review also noted that the Wall Street Journal had recently reported that the power grid had been penetrated by Chinese and Russian hackers and laced with logic bombs, as Clarke and Knake had contended.98 That front page Wall Street Journal article from April 2009 is often cited as evidence for the proposition that the power grid is rigged to blow, but it could just as easily be cited as an example of “mere conduit” reporting.99 Similar to Judith Miller’s Iraq WMD articles, the only sources for the article’s claim that key infrastructure has been compromised are anonymous U.S. intelligence officials.100 With little specificity about the alleged infiltrations, readers are left with no way to verify the claims. The article does cite a public pronouncement by senior CIA official Tom Donahue that a cyber attack had caused a power blackout overseas.101 But Donahue’s pronouncement is what Clarke and Knake cite for their claim that cyber attacks caused a blackout in Brazil, which we now know is untrue.102 The author of the article, Siobhan Gorman, also contributed to another front-page Wall Street Journal cybersecurity scoop reporting that spies had infiltrated Pentagon computers and had stolen terabytes of data related to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.103 The only sources for that report were “current and former government officials familiar with the attacks.”104 Later reporting by the Associated Press, also citing anonymous officials, found that no classified information was compromised in the breach.105 Unfortunately, without any official statement on the matter, the result of these reports can well be to raise public alarm without offering a clear sense of the scope or magnitude of the threat. The now-debunked Brazil blackout was also the subject of a CBS 60 Minutes exposé on cyber war.106 For its claim that the blackouts were the result of cyber attacks, the newsmagazine cited only anonymous “prominent intelligence sources.”107 The 60 Minutes report, however, did feature an interview with former NSA chief, now Booz Allen Hamilton vice president, Mike McConnell, who said a blackout was within reach of foreign hackers and that the United States was not prepared for such an attack.108 In February of 2010, the Washington Post granted McConnel a rare 1,400 word essay in its Sunday opinion section in which he made the cyber war case. He told readers, “If an enemy disrupted our financial and accounting transactions, our equities and bond markets or our retail commerce—or created confusion about the legitimacy of those transactions—chaos would result. Our power grids, air and ground transportation, telecommunications, and water-filtration systems are in jeopardy as well.”109 While he did not provide any specific evidence to corroborate this fear, McConnell did point to corporate espionage generally, and specifically the then-recent incident in which Google’s Gmail service had been compromised—another instance of espionage attributed to China—as evidence of a cyber threat.110 The result is more conflation of possible cyber threats. In July 2010, the cover of the Economist magazine featured a city consumed by a pixelated mushroom cloud overlaid with the words, “Cyberwar: The threat from the internet.”111 The popular conception of cyber threats fostered by the media, often relying on anonymous government sources and the pronouncements of defense contractors and consultants, can be said to be more alarming than the verifiable evidence available would suggest. And as we will see, anonymously sourced threats and expert assertions reported in the media are later cited by officials as rationales for regulation. 4. Congress Congress has also been quick to adopt the alarmist rhetoric of cyber doom espoused by the proponents of government intervention.112 For example, writing in the Wall Street Journal in support of their co-sponsored cybersecurity bill, Sens. Jay Rockefeller and Olympia Snowe warned citizens about the potential of “catastrophic economic loss and social havoc” from cyber attack.113 However, they provided no specifics of the threat and instead argued from authority that “[a]s members of both the Senate Commerce and Intelligence committees, we know our national security and our economic security is at risk.” 114 Another argument from authority is in the very first sentence of their op-ed, which quotes Mike McConnell’s oft-repeated warning, “If the nation went to war today in a cyberwar, we would lose.”115 Members of Congress have used the same rhetoric at hearings on cybersecurity. In one such hearing, Sen. Rockefeller stated, It would be very easy to make train switches so that two trains collide, affect or disrupt water and electricity, or release water from dams, where the computers are involved. How our money moves, they could stop that. Any part of the country, all of the country is vulnerable. How the Internet and telephone communication systems work, attackers could handle that rather easily.116 At another hearing, Sen. Rockefeller noted that “a major cyber attack could shut down our Nation’s most critical infrastructure: our power grid, telecommunications, financial services; you just think of it, and they can do it.”117 Sen. Snowe agreed, adding that “if we fail to take swift action, we risk a cybercalamity of epic proportions, with devastating implications for our Nation.” 118 Other members of Congress have adopted similarly alarmist rhetoric.119 Speaking at a hearing, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin stated that “cyber weapons and cyber attacks potentially can be devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects.”120 Rep. Yvette Clarke, chairwoman of the House committee focused on cybersecurity, has said, “There is no more significant threat to our national and economic security than that which we face in cyberspace.” 121 In each of these instances, members of Congress have not offered any reviewable evidence to support their claims.

#### No retaliation and airgapping checks

**Bailey 11 –** [Ronald is Reason's science correspondent. “Cyberwar Is Harder Than It Looks: Internet vulnerability to attacks exaggerated, says new report.” 1/18/2011, <http://reason.com/archives/2011/01/18/cyberwar-is-harder-than-it>]

Brown and Sommer conclude, “It is **unlikely** that there will ever be a true cyberwar.” By cyberwar, they mean one fought solely over and with information technologies. Why? Because it takes a lot of effort to figure out new vulnerabilities in already protected critical systems and the effects of an attack are difficult to predict, including blowback on the perpetrators. More importantly, they note, “There is no strategic reason why an aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.” In a real war, cyberattacks would be an adjunct to conventional efforts to blow up critical infrastructure. Because attacks can be launched from any set of computers, attackers can remain hidden. Consequently, a strategy of deterrence will not work in cyberwarfare because the target for retaliation is unknown. This means that **resilience** is the **main defense** against cyberweapons, a combination of preventive measures and contingency plans for a quick post-attack recovery. If cyberwarfare against infrastructure was easy, terrorists like Al Qaeda would have already tried the tactic against us and our NATO allies. Brown and Sommer observe that the Internet and the physical telecommunications infrastructure were designed to be robust and self-healing, so that failures in one part are routed around. “You have to be cautious when hearing from people engaging in fear-mongering about huge blackouts and collapses of critical infrastructures via the Internet,” says University of Toronto cyberwarfare expert Ronald Deibert in the January/February 2011 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “There is a lot of **redundancy** in the networks; it’s not a simple thing to turn off the power grid.” In addition, our experience with current forms of malware is somewhat reassuring. Responses to new malware have generally been found and made available within days and few denial of service attacks have lasted more than a day. In addition, many critical networks such as those carrying financial transactions are not connected to the Internet requiring insider information to make them vulnerable. While not everyone uses up-to-date malware detection, most government agencies, major businesses, and many individuals do, which means that would-be attackers must take the time and effort to find new flaws and develop new techniques. For example, the success of the Stuxnet worm that attacked and disabled Iranian nuclear centrifuges required very extensive intelligence gathering and knowledge of specific software flaws as well as someone able to walk into the facilities with an infected USB drive. Brown and Sommers urge governments to ratify the CyberCrime Convention. The chief treaty holdouts are Russia and China, countries from which many recent cyberattacks appear to have originated. “We should not forget that many of the countries that are havens for cybercrime have invested billions in domestic communications monitoring to supplement an already extensive set of police tools for political control,” notes James Lewis. “The notion that a cybercriminal in one of these countries operates without the knowledge and thus tacit consent of the government is difficult to accept. A hacker who turned his sights from Tallinn to the Kremlin would have only hours before his service were cut off, his door was smashed down and his computer confiscated.” Another fruitful way to address emerging cyber threats suggested by the authors is to strengthen connections between national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). CERT experts operate as a kind of early warning system who also devise software fixes to stop the spread of new malware. And they think that public policy, including procurement, can be used to encourage the development of properly tested hardware and software. While blowing up the Internet probably won't happen, espionage, hacking, and malware will be with us always. Whatever we do to defend against them, will also defend against the threat of cyberwarfare

### 2ac cir

#### Won’t pass and will be piecemeal- takes out the internal link

**Gomez, 10/17/13** (Alan, USA Today, “Shutdown over, Democrats say immigration is next”

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/17/government-shutdown-shift-immigration-reform/3000575/>

WASHINGTON — Before the bill to end the budget impasse even hit President Obama's desk Wednesday, he and congressional Democrats had pivoted to what they hope is the next big legislative battle: an overhaul of the nation's immigration laws including citizenship for the nation's 12 million undocumented immigrants.

"I look forward to the next venture, which is making sure we do immigration reform," Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., said late Wednesday.

"Good luck," said Rep. Trey Gowdy, R-S.C., who chairs the House immigration committee.

House Republicans emerged from the 16-day shutdown fight angered at the White House and Reid for refusing to negotiate over the terms to end the shutdown and lift the nation's debt ceiling, and emboldened to wage more strategic legislative strikes in the future.

Gowdy has been moderately supportive of immigration changes and says he maintains good relationships with House Democrats. "But it's a little disingenuous to treat the House as an irrelevant branch of government and then say, 'By the way, tomorrow you'll need to go ahead and push (immigration reform),'" Gowdy said. "It doesn't work that way."

Democrats are hopeful that Republicans, mindful of the party's poor standing nationally with Hispanics, will support a comprehensive approach. Obama said Thursday that immigration is one of the three agenda items he wants Congress to pass this year. Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., told MSNBC Thursday that an immigration overhaul is "the thing (Obama) wants to get more than anything else" in his second term.

House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, remains publicly and privately committed to advancing immigration legislation in this Congress, but there is virtually no interest among GOP lawmakers to advance the kind of sweeping bill that Democrats are seeking. Instead, Republicans are more likely to pursue a piecemeal approach to address issues individually, such as border security and visas for high-skilled workers.

Rep. Raul Labrador, R-Idaho, a Tea Party conservative who was once a member of a bipartisan House group that tried to draft a broad immigration bill, said the prospects for even smaller bills are slim in the House.

"It's not going to happen this year," Labrador said. "After the way the president acted over the last two or three weeks where he would refuse to talk to the speaker of the House ... they're not going to get immigration reform. That's done."

Getting immigration changes through the House was always going to be a difficult task. The majority of House Republicans have consistently opposed the bill passed by the Senate in July that allows the nation's undocumented immigrants to apply for U.S. citizenship after 13 years, something many in the conference refer to as "amnesty."

That means Boehner, who struggled to unify his members throughout the shutdown, would have to "divide the conference" to pass an immigration bill, said Rep. Tim Huelskamp, R-Kan.

"That would really melt down the conference," said Huelskamp, a Tea Party conservative.

#### Don’t evaluate the disad- it’s not an opportunity cost

#### Budget negotiations thump

**Wilson, 10/16/13** (Scott, Washington Post, “Obama plans to renew immigration, climate change efforts” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-plans-to-renew-immigration-climate-change-efforts/2013/10/16/d0a96cbe-367b-11e3-be86-6aeaa439845b_story.html>

Now administration officials say they hope to persuade a chastened Republican Party, battered in the polls, to support elements of Obama’s languishing agenda.

“There are things that we know will help strengthen our economy that we could get done before this year is out,” Obama said in a statement Wednesday night. “We still need to pass a law to fix our broken immigration system. We still need to pass a farm bill. And with the shutdown behind us and budget committees forming, we now have an opportunity to focus on a sensible budget that is responsible, that is fair, and that helps hardworking people all across this country.”

But the new fiscal deadlines, looming just months away, mean that much of Obama’s energy in the near term is likely to be consumed by budget talks. Democrats worry that the agreement may set in motion a process that runs out the clock on Obama’s ability to secure other policy gains before the 2014 midterm elections.

#### Obama doesn’t push the plan

**Fiedler, 13–** WLS web writer (Christine, “Bobby Rush pushes for better trade relations with Cuba”, <http://www.wlsam.com/common/page.php?pt=Bobby+Rush+pushes+for+better+trade+relations+with+Cuba&id=37263&is_corp=0>, NG)

Congressman Bobby Rush is trying to lift trade restrictions on Cuba. He reintroduced legislation to lift the embargo, travel, and parcel restrictions, normalize trade relations, and it would take Cuba off of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

Rush says the U.S. has "shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance" and that "Cuba is no longer a threat" to the U.S.

His bill also asks for the release of Alan Phillip Gross. Gross was working as a U.S. government contractor when he was arrested and prosecuted in 2011 for bringing phones and computer equipment to Cuba's Jewish community without a permit. He is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba.

Improving U.S.-Cuba relations has been a goal of Rush; this follows his United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act in 2009.

#### Fiat solves the link

#### Bipartisan negotiations fail- winners win

**Dickerson, 13–** Chief Political Correspondent at the Slate, Political Director of CBS News, Covered Politics for Time Magazine for 12 Years, Previous White House Correspondent

(John, “Go for the Throat!”, http://tinyurl.com/b7zvv4d)//NG

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon.¶ Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day.¶ But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That **bipartisan** bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country.¶ The challenge for President Obama’s speech is the challenge of his second term: how to be great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of **time** before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation can only cement his legacy if he **destroys the GOP**. If he wants to transform American politics, he must **go for the throat**.¶ President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker.¶ How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the first administration might have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. ¶ That's the old way. He has abandoned that. He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. ¶ Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of **clarifying fights over controversial issues**, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray. ¶ This theory of political transformation rests on the weaponization (and slight bastardization) of the work by Yale political scientist Stephen Skowronek. Skowronek has written extensively about what distinguishes transformational presidents from caretaker presidents. In order for a president to be transformational, the old order has to fall as the orthodoxies that kept it in power exhaust themselves. Obama's gambit in 2009 was to build a new post-partisan consensus. That didn't work, but by exploiting the weaknesses of today’s Republican Party, Obama has an opportunity to hasten the demise of the old order by increasing the political cost of having the GOP coalition defined by Second Amendment absolutists, **climate science deniers**, supporters of “self-deportation” and the pure no-tax wing.

#### **Plan popular – oil lobby**

Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW

ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. 35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes.3126 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures. 37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply."38

This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates.39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves.40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation. 41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." 42

THE BP DISASTER ADDS TO CONCERNS Further pressure on the embargo comes from those voicing environmental concerns about Cuba's drilling plans.43 These concerns are undoubtedly more poignant in the wake of British Petroleum's ("BP") historically tragic Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 44 Currently, there is no agreement between the United States and Cuba to deal with oil spills. 45 The embargo would prevent, or at least hamper, any efforts by U.S. companies to aid any cleanup efforts. 46 In addition, the embargo bans U.S. technologies designed to prevent or contain oil spills from being sold to Cuba.47 David Guggenheim, a senior fellow at the Washington Ocean Foundation punctuated the United States' concerns over the potential impacts of Cuba's drilling by remarking that "the Gulf isn't going to respect any boundaries when it comes to oil spills." 48 This statement was recently exemplified by Cuba's own expressed fears that oil from the BP disaster would reach its shores. 49 The Deep Horizon oil spill's threat was enough that several Cuban leaders called for the reexamination of Cuba's own plan to extract oil off its shores.50 Nonetheless, Cuba's oil exploration plans seem unfazed.5'

#### Voting neg triggers the link- the round is a debate in congress

#### PC fails and not top of the docket

**Nakamura, 10/17/13** (David, Washington Post, “Democrats renew push for immigration bill” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-renew-push-for-immigration-bill/2013/10/17/1d5e6afe-374a-11e3-ae46-e4248e75c8ea_story.html>)

But it’s not clear that GOP lawmakers, who took the brunt of public blame for the 16-day shutdown, will be forced to the negotiating table. Some key Republicans said this week that Obama’s hard-line position during the fiscal talks, in which he refused to negotiate, had further damaged his credibility with a caucus already skeptical of his agenda.

Rep. Raul R. Labrador (R-Idaho) told a conservative audience on Wednesday that “it would be crazy for the House Republican leadership to enter into negotiations with him on immigration.”

Labrador, who dropped out of a bipartisan House effort last spring to strike a comprehensive immigration deal, added: “Anything we negotiate right now with the president on immigration will be with that same goal in mind, which is to destroy the Republican Party.”

House GOP leaders remained largely silent on the issue Thursday. A spokesman for Speaker John A. Boehner (Ohio) said he “remains committed to a common-sense, step-by-step approach that ensures we get immigration reform done right.”

Boehner has said the House will not support a bipartisan plan approved by the Senate in June that features a 13-year path to citizenship for the nation’s 12 million undocumented immigrants. Instead, House leadership has said it is pursuing a series of smaller-scale bills, a tactic that immigration advocates view as a cloaked attempt to kill any momentum for a deal.

One key question is how the fiscal standoff and its aftermath might effect Boehner’s approach to immigration.

On one hand, immigration advocates said, Boehner has appeared to emerge with more respect from the conservative bloc of the GOP caucus long skeptical of his willingness to take on the White House. That could embolden him to push for a broader set of immigration proposals that could result in a conference with the Senate.

On the other hand, Boehner was forced to bring a short-term spending plan to the House floor late Wednesday that was approved with mostly Democratic support, a move the speaker acknowledged was a political loss for his party. That could make him fearful of pursuing a vote on an immigration plan that would also likely depend heavily on Democrats.

“Have the hard-liners been empowered or is the leadership getting tired of their reign?” said Tamar Jacoby, the chief executive of Immigration Works, which advocates for immigration reform on behalf of small businesses. “Does the leadership feel they have new room to maneuver or not? I don’t think anyone knows how that dynamic has been shaken up.”

### 2ac security

#### Framework – the k must prove that the whole plan is bad – weighing the AFF is vital to fair and predictable engagement – the ballot should simulate the plans enactment and test whether it’s better than the status quo or competitive alternative

#### Reps don’t affect reality – material structure are more important and they cede the political

**Tuathail 96 –** [Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct]

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is **inadequate** by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Perm: do the plan and sever reps justified by the 1nc

#### Realism and securitization are inevitable

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

#### Doesn’t resolve how other countries react- can’t solve

#### **The plan gives security transformative potential --- alt alone fails and their impact is false**

Nunes, 12 [Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies, João Nunes, Security Dialogue 2012 43: 345,Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, p. sage publications]

In the works of these authors, one can identify a tendency to see security as inherently connected to exclusion, totalization and even violence. The idea of a ‘logic’ of security is now widely present in the critical security studies literature. Claudia Aradau (2008: 72), for example, writes of an ‘exclusionary logic of security’ underpinning and legitimizing ‘forms of domination’. Rens van Munster (2007: 239) assumes a ‘logic of security’, predicated upon a ‘political organization on the exclusionary basis of fear’. Laura Shepherd (2008: 70) also identifies a liberal and highly problematic ‘organizational logic’ in security. Although there would probably be disagreement over the degree to which this logic is inescapable, it is symptomatic of an overwhelmingly pessimistic outlook that a great number of critical scholars are now making the case for moving away from security. The normative preference for desecuritization has been picked up in attempts to contest, resist and ‘unmake’ security (Aradau, 2004; Huysmans, 2006; Bigo, 2007). For these contributions, security cannot be reconstructed and political transformation can only be brought about when security and its logic are removed from the equation (Aradau, 2008; Van Munster, 2009; Peoples, 2011). This tendency in the literature is problematic for the critique of security in at least three ways. First, it constitutes a blind spot in the effort of politicization. The assumption of an exclusionary, totalizing or violent logic of security can be seen as an essentialization and a moment of closure. To be faithful to itself, the politicization of security would need to recognize that there is nothing natural or necessary about security – and that security as a paradigm of thought or a register of meaning is also a construction that depends upon its reproduction and performance through practice. The exclusionary and violent meanings that have been attached to security are themselves the result of social and historical processes, and can thus be changed. Second, the institution of this apolitical realm runs counter to the purposes of critique by foreclosing an engagement with the different ways in which security may be constructed. As Matt McDonald (2012) has argued, because security means different things for different people, one must always understand it in context. Assuming from the start that security implies the narrowing of choice and the empowerment of an elite forecloses the acknowledgment of security claims that may seek to achieve exactly the opposite: alternative possibilities in an already narrow debate and the contestation of elite power.5 In connection to this, the claims to insecurity put forward by individuals and groups run the risk of being neglected if the desire to be more secure is identified with a compulsion towards totalization, and if aspirations to a life with a degree of predictability are identified with violence. Finally, this tendency blunts critical security studies as a resource for practical politics. By overlooking the possibility of reconsidering security from within – **opting instead for its replacement** with other ideals – the critical field weakens its capacity to confront head-on the exceptionalist connotations that security has acquired in policymaking circles. Critical scholars run the risk of playing into this agenda when they tie security to exclusionary and violent practices, thereby failing to question security actors as they take those views for granted and act as if they were inevitable. Overall, security is just too important – both as a concept and as a political instrument – to be simply abandoned by critical scholars. As McDonald (2012: 163) has put it, If security is politically powerful, is the foundation of political legitimacy for a range of actors, and involves the articulation of our core values and the means of their protection, we cannot afford to allow dominant discourses of security to be confused with the essence of security itself. In sum, the trajectory that critical security studies has taken in recent years has significant limitations. The politicization of security has made extraordinary progress in problematizing predominant security ideas and practices; however, it has paradoxically resulted in a depoliticization of the meaning of security itself. By foreclosing the possibility of alternative notions of security, this imbalanced politicization weakens the analytical capacity of critical security studies, undermines its ability to function as a political resource and runs the risk of being politically counterproductive. Seeking to address these limitations, the next section revisits emancipatory understandings of security.

#### Security isn’t fundamental – the alt causes conservative backlash and threats real

Nunes, 12 [Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies, João Nunes, Security Dialogue 2012 43: 345,Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, p. sage publications]

Conclusion This article advanced three main arguments. First, the commitment to politicization that constitutes the cornerstone of critical security studies has been detrimentally affected by a tendency to conceive security as having an undesirable logic. This happens at a time when critique is blunted by the proliferation of the ‘critical’ label and by the successes of critical security studies in highlighting the problems with predominant ways of thinking and doing security. Next, it was argued that security as emancipation can potentially provide a platform **for reclaiming** **the political** in critical security studies. By taking insecurity as its starting point, by conceiving theory as a form of praxis and by mobilizing immanent critique, this approach promises to address the current blind spots of politicization. Finally, the article provided a revision of security as emancipation that addresses the shortcomings of the versions provided by Booth and Wyn Jones. Two themes are central to this revised version: recognition of the political relations and structures underpinning the reality of security, and engagement with the multifaceted nature of power as determination of action, government and domination. This article has suggested that a re-engagement with – as well as reconsideration of – security as emancipation is crucial for addressing the current impasse in critical security studies. As in previous moments in the development of this field, there is much to gain from dialogue between approaches. However, this discussion also suggests that it is perhaps time to abandon the idea of a division of labour between the deconstructive and reconstructive sides of critical security studies. This was at the heart of the Copenhagen School’s reluctance to consider at length the transformative potential of its work.14 It was also accepted by Booth, for whom deconstructing security is runs the risk of becoming a conservative stance that diverts attention from the ‘real’ condition of insecurity. In contrast with this division of labour, this article has begun to show the fruitfulness of a cumulative vision of critique. Indeed, the reconsideration of security as emancipation proposed here points towards a notion of critique that is committed to deconstruction but also unashamedly reconstructive. It brings together insights that for too long have been kept apart in the critical literature, and introduces other insights that so far have been insufficiently considered: that security has no fundamental logic; that a detailed analysis of its assumptions and effects can be achieved by problematizing its reality and by working with a broad notion of power; that one can make judgments about the desirability of security arrangements by considering structures and relations of vulnerability and disadvantage; and that, on the basis of this, it is possible to identify potential for transformation and devise strategies to achieve it. The conjunction of these insights can help realize the promise of the critical security literature and provide critique with a renewed strength and sense of purpose.

#### No empirical link between framing and conflict

**Kaufman**, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **‘9**

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed**.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

#### Critiques of realism ignore its ability to promote cooperation and diplomacy- complete rejection turns alt solvency. It’s better to take small steps like the plan

**Murray, 97 -** professor of politics at the University of Wales (Alistair, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, netlibrary)

Given these problems, the attempt to establish an alternative, feminist epistemology falls apart. The aim to provide a 'new' theory of human nature just looks unnecessary when it is noted that the conventional view of the human character derived from realism is in fact simultaneously moral and immoral, 'both conflictual and cooperative', as Tickner demands. Similarly, the concern to redefine power amounts to little more than a sophisticated word game. 'Mutual enablement' ultimately sounds like some dreadful slogan dreamt up by a management consultant. The fact that realist theorists define power in terms of the ability to coerce does not mean that they neglect the ability to persuade as a tool in international politics, only that they define power in more rigorous terms than feminists, calling each by a different name to avoid confusion. Nor does it mean that, by doing this, they neglect the ability of international actors to co-operate, or that they exclude from consideration the co-operative basis upon which power relies or the co-operative objectives to which it tends. If Tickner had read beyond the first chapter of Politics among Nations, she might have come across phrases such as the balance of power, in which curious things called 'alliances' and 'grand coalitions' co-operatively generate power towards co-operative ends. Conflict is not perpetual in the realist vision of international relations, and coalition building is ultimately just as essential to the realist account of international politics as it is to feminist accounts. Consequently, it is not surprising that the third strut of this new feminist epistemology, a broader notion of national security, seems simply unnecessary. Acknowledging the interdependence of human security in an age of nuclear holocaust and environmental degeneration would hardly seem to be a preserve of feminism. What of everything that George Kennan has said on this subject over the last forty years? Nor can we accept the notion that we need to redefine conflict resolution to focus more on mutually beneficial oufeomes, when realism is deeply concerned with the amelioration of difference by diplomacy. What of the nine points with which Morgenthau concludes Politics among Nations? Nor can we accept the notion that 'maternal thinking' and a female, contextual morality are required to attempt to confine conflict to non-violent means. A persistent theme of realism is that humility of self and toleration of others are the foremost moral imperatives, that conflict should not be permitted to become an ideological war of absolutes in which all enemies are monsters, all actions are legitimate, and all peaces are but punitive armistices. One ultimately has to question the need for a specifically feminist theory of international relations. We currently do not have two radically opposed standpoints, masculine and feminine, but a unified human standpoint which, with modifications, serves us reasonably well. Tickner, of course, cannot accept any of this: essential to her entire argument — indeed, her entire self-identity — is the notion that practices such as 'coalition building' are very specifically a 'female strategy', beyond the wit of conventional — male — theorists to master. She is careful to avoid suggesting that women are innately more virtuous than men, proposing only that they have been socialised into more virtuous behaviour. She is careful to avoid the suggestion that this implies that masculine perspectives are to be entirely replaced by feminist perspectives, proposing only that the two must be integrated until such time as gender can be transcended as a factor. 63 But a central problem remains. Not only does her position require some rather fast rewriting of the literature of international relations theory, but it necessitates a serious distortion of our understanding of international relations itself. The inability to discover an independent feminist position means that, in order to justify the establishment of a separate feminist approach to international politics, one must be artificially constructed by appropriating elements from conventional theory and labelling them as female in orientation, such as 'the female strategy of coalition building', and grouping what remains into an alternative set of negative, male strategies, such as that of conflict, against which feminist strategies can be contrasted and thus privileged.64 In the process of this act of intellectual vandalism, the essential ambiguity of the political, and the essential duality of its concepts, are lost. It is simply not enough to divide the concepts and categories of international relations into two groupings; Tickner must, in addition, be able to privilege the female set in order to demonstrate the necessity of a feminist perspective. Consequently, it becomes necessary to assume that, if co-operation is a female strategy, all co-operation is positive, whereas all conflict, being, of course, a male strategy, is negative. The problem is that actors frequently conflict for moral ends and co-operate for immoral ends. Thus, if the progressive critique of realism reaches its highest form in feminism, the progressive urge similarly reaches its apogee, a cancer growing within theory, so incapable of fostering a position of its own that it must steal the realist's clothes in order to survive, oblivious of the damage which this conceptual mugging does to their utility.

#### We control uniqueness – violence is at its lowest level in history because hegemony and strong economic growth are the deeper proximate checks against war

\*War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove heg solves war because it makes democratic peace resilient globalization sustainable---it’s the deeper cause of proximate checks against war

**Owen 11 –** John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us?

Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological.

Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A.

But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another.

Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now.

Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries).

These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars.

We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony.

A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant.

There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world.

How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history.

The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth.

Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### Our transition wars impact is psychologically verifiable

**Wohlforth, 09** – professor of government at Dartmouth (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Affairs, January, project muse)

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29]

Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.

Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

#### Alt fails – cooption – political engagement key

McCormack, 10 [Tara, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 137-138]

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals **has served to** **enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them**. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have **no way of controlling or influencing** these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework **has not challenged the status quo**, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states **can easily adopt** a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). **Without concrete engagement and analysis**, however, **the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other**. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered **renders them actually unable to engage** with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.